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tended to clearly intended acts). Piaget's six stages of sensorimotor development could be reread in this way, from reflex activity as a prototypical instance of reactive, unintended behavior, to the Stage VI capacity for communicating one's intentions symbolically as a prototypical instance of intentional action. Lewis's five levels in the development of intention could be reread in this way as well, except for his belief that it is necessary to postulate the existence of intention from the beginning. His sequence of levels adds much to Piaget's stages of sensorimotor development, especially with regard to emotion. But I believe that, in addition to confusing intention with Intentionality and avoiding the problem of novelty, his equation of all goal-directedness with intention is unreasonable insofar as it entails the subsumption of fairly prototypical instances of unintentional behavior (e.g., reflexes, tropisms, the behavior of servomechanisms) as positive instances of the concept. I sympathize with the desire to trace the commonalities between such phenomena and human mental life, but I believe this goal should be accomplished by developing new concepts which connect the prototypical intentional and unintentional instances rather than by stretching the concept of intention beyond the bounds of its usual meaning. As I have argued elsewhere (Chapman, 1988), Piaget's constructivism can be interpreted as such an attempt to trace the evolutionary and developmental contended to clearly intended acts). Piaget's six stages of sensorimotor development could be reread in this way, from reflex activity as a prototypical instance of reactive, unintended behavior, to the Stage VI capacity for communicating one's intentions symbolically as a prototypical instance of intentional action. Lewis's five levels in the development of intention could be reread in this way as well, except for his belief that it is necessary to postulate the existence of intention from the beginning. His sequence of levels adds much to Piaget's stages of sensorimotor development, especially with regard to emotion. But I believe that, in addition to confusing intention with Intentionality and avoiding the problem of novelty, his equation of all goal-directedness with intention is unreasonable insofar as it entails the subsumption of fairly prototypical instances of unintentional behavior (e.g., reflexes, tropisms, the behavior of servomechanisms) as positive instances of the concept. I sympathize with the desire to trace the commonalities between such phenomena and human mental life, but I believe this goal should be accomplished by developing new concepts which connect the prototypical intentional and unintentional instances rather than by stretching the concept of intention beyond the bounds of its usual meaning. As I have argued elsewhere (Chapman, 1988), Piaget's constructivism can be interpreted as such an attempt to trace the evolutionary and developmental con-
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Michael Lewis tackles two monsters of psychology-intentionality and consciousness-and I congratulate him for his courageous attempt which has forced me to make the very salutary effort of reflection and clarification.
His thesis consists in completely dissociating intentionality and consciousness. Behaviors are intentional from the beginning of the sensorimotor stage whereas reflexive consciousness does not appear until the end of this stage, that is, around 18 months. He thus radically opposes the Piagetian thesis according to which consciousness and intentionality are in close solidarity and progressively emerge in the course of the sensorimotor stage and give rise to human intelligence (psychic or mental activities). Lewis describes the development of intentionality in the sensorimotor stage in five levels closely related to emotional development.
The major target aimed at by Lewis in his article is Piaget. Now to start with, I have to declare my disagreement with his interpretation of the Piagetian theses. Therefore, I am bound to make explicit my own interpretation of Piaget for general as well as for specific issues raised by the article, and to initiate a first confrontation between Lewis and Piaget, which will unfortunately strongly overload my commentary. Finally, I present my own critical position which consists in considering consciousness as a necessary transitional phenomenon for cognitive development and more precisely for Michael Lewis tackles two monsters of psychology-intentionality and consciousness-and I congratulate him for his courageous attempt which has forced me to make the very salutary effort of reflection and clarification.
The major target aimed at by Lewis in his article is Piaget. Now to start with, I have to declare my disagreement with his interpretation of the Piagetian theses. Therefore, I am bound to make explicit my own interpretation of Piaget for general as well as for specific issues raised by the article, and to initiate a first confrontation between Lewis and Piaget, which will unfortunately strongly overload my commentary. With regard to structural discontinuity, however, Piaget qualifies this permanence or the structures that determine it as practical because they only characterize a functioning. They do not exist consciously from the subject's point of view but only from the observer's point of view. It may be useful to recall that for Piaget there is a primary consciousness, or consciousness of "it is desirable," "it is painful" , p. 112/127). Subjective permanence (Stages 3 and 4) will succeed to the practical one; it begins to exist for the subject thanks to his or her consciousness and eventually leads to objective permanence (Stages 5 and 6). This last one is later retermed practical by Piaget himself. As we see later, such a change creates other kinds of problems ; for a discussion, see . By introducing the distinction between the subject's and the observer's points of view, Piaget tries to reconcile the aspects of functional and structural discontinuity. This distinction corresponds to the opposition that he later sets up between biological or neurophysiological structures inherent in a functioning and mental structures produced by this functioning (or resulting from this functioning; Piaget, 1967/1971, p. 257/222). (I do not consider these distinctions relevant for qualifying structures. It is one of the arguments that has led me to postulate structural preformation; see As we have just seen with object permanence, it is difficult but nevertheless necessary to find ways to contrast and compare different achievement levels within a given behavioral category. Lewis considers this problem in detail in the section entitled "Levels of Meaning." Referring to Werner, he warns against falling prey to a "constancy fallacy" by equating behaviors at different ontogenetic or phylogenetic levels. 
Lewis-Piaget Controversy
Lewis's Thesis
The central thesis of Lewis's article is the claim that intentionality is a property of all goal-directed systems that have desires (emotions). I do not think that such a general statement can elicit many debates. Lewis's formulation is sometimes more radical, for instance, when he ascribes intentionality to all goal-directed systems including inanimate ones. With such an extreme formulation, he renders explicit his hypothesis of total independence between intentionality and consciousness. I nevertheless consider that the thesis discussed in the article is limited to systems having desires or emotions.
Simultaneously, Lewis claims that reflexive consciousness (also called objective self-awareness) does not appear before his fifth stage-that is to say, around 18 months (Lewis, 1990 ). The role of consciousness is limited to explaining the emergence of two new classes of emotions (the ones related to objective self-awareness and to selfconscious evaluative emotions). Lewis dissociates completely the problem of intentionality from that of consciousness. Indeed, awareness or subjective self-awareness emerges as early as his third level, but in fact he speaks less of awareness than of representation. The novelty of his third level is the emergence of representation ("At some point, representations . . . are established").
Thus, the levels of consciousness distinguished by Lewis do not play any role as far as the development of intentionality is concerned and seem to proceed from the general progress of cognitive development.
Piaget's Thesis
Concerning relations between intentionaiity and consciousness, the basic Piagetian thesis is that there is no intentionality without consciousness. Intentionality results from grasps of consciousness or from consciousness phenomena. On the other hand, consciousness comes from disadaptations, the action being defined as a response to a need. Finally, needs are conceived as the manifestation of a desequilibrium, of a disadaptation. "Need must not be conceived as being independent of global functioning of which it is only an indication" , p. 45/58).
According to Piaget, the following connections are present at the beginning of sensorimotor development: Need state -> desequilibrium or disadaptation -> response or action -> grasps of consciousness.
These relations would be subsequently transformed in the following way: consciousness of desequilibrium (of a prob-ical structures or structures described as inherent in a functioning in opposition to invariants from the last two sensorimotor stages, or objective permanence, which are due to mental implicative structures resulting from the subject's functioning itself. Between these two levels there is for Piaget no transmission of any particular structure, but only transmission of a functioning "that is capable of going far and learning almost limitlessly" , p. 297/257). I clarify my disagreement with this thesis later on.
Let us now examine which processes postulated by Lewis are needed to account for functionally equivalent behaviors belonging to the five levels of intentionality. But first we must briefly introduce these levels constituting the essential part of his argument.
In the first two levels (the first 6 or 7 weeks), there is adaptive intention-that is, an intention bound to adaptive survival functions of the organism. At the first level, only two emotional states (feeling good and feeling bad) are connected to desire. Approach or avoidance of these states are qualified as intentional. We have already seen why such a formula only partially contradicts Piaget, who maintains that at the very beginning of development, needs and means to satisfy them are functional totalities which cannot be dissociated.
Intention becomes cognitive (third and fourth levels) when representations have been constructed and associated to desires; then these representations and the desires constitute goals. These representations become independent from environmental context. As mentioned by Lewis, his description is strongly inspired by Piaget. About the shift from the second to the third level, Lewis speaks about the reversal of the direction of effect: Whereas at the second level infants react to external events, at the third level they act on external events. I assume that Lewis is referring to the change described by Piaget from the causal order of action to the implicative order of conscious phenomena. This shift constitutes the turning point in the Piagetian explanation, as we have seen. Now Lewis, after having declared that his third level is "the most problematic," the one during which the infant's goals "become independent of environmental context for their activation," tells us that there is no evidence to differentiate his third level from the second. As I have already mentioned, he establishes no connections with consciousness. Therefore it becomes obvious that Lewis has not understood the fundamental change introduced by consciousness in Piaget's thesis. Finally, at the fifth level, intention becomes conscious. Thus, from 18 months on, the infant, after the diversification of goals produced by the differentiation of desires (emotions), is able to take into account various goals simultaneously; the diversification of means enables him or her to utilize alternatives.
There are basically two kinds of processes postulated by Lewis to explain this genesis: emotional and cognitive. These levels are determined partly by the development of emotions (considered as equivalent to desires). He views emotional development in the light of the traditional model proposed by Bridges, which is based on a differentiation process going from simple to complex: "The differentiation lem, of a goal to be reached) -implicative relations between means and goal (intentionality) --action.
For Piaget, intentional behaviors (i.e., those based on relations of implication in a broad sense) can therefore only proceed, ontogenetically, to the grasps of consciousness. Intentionality and consciousness develop progressively from the very beginning. However, they do not reach the true status of consciousness and intentionality until the fourth stage with means-ends coordination corresponding, we might say, to the emergence of well-formed relations of implication. Instead of means-ends coordination it may be more appropriate from my point of view to speak of the dissociation or decomposition of initial global schemes, wherein it is not possible to distinguish means and ends (desires and means to satisfy them); they define what Piaget called a global functioning. "The basic fact is not need as such but rather the act of assimilation, which embodies in one whole functional need, repetition and that coordination between subject and object which foretells discrepancy [the correct translation would be implication] and judgment" For Lewis, the existence of equivalent functioning at the different levels of the sensorimotor period (or functional continuity) is certified by the intentional behaviors. What is it then that differentiates for him what we could call the discontinuity or the change in the processes between his first and his fifth level? It could be the emergence of consciousness (or awareness), which is absent from the two first levels. However, consciousness does not play any role for him; it cannot therefore be a process. There are two other possible candidates: memory and representation. As for memory, it is mainly a matter of growth, which can be supposed as continuous; it does not seem to constitute a qualitative change in the process. Representation, on the other hand, does not appear until his third level in conjunction with subject selfawareness. So we are confronted with what Lewis calls a mixed developmental model, that is, a model going from the absence to the presence of a given characteristic or component. For Lewis, the mixed model concerns representation whereas Piaget's model (in Lewis's version) concerns intentionality. In the end, the article seems a long detour to replace the absence of intentionality with the absence of representation, having lost on the way the essence of the Piagetian interpretation.
Piaget, as I understand him, tries to explain the transition from biological structures inherent in a functioning to mental structures produced by this functioning, the sensorimotor structures defining the emergence of consciousness, of intentionality, of intelligence, of psychism, of mental processes. This emergence has been situated during the fourth sensorimotor stage in a partially arbitrary way, as Piaget has emphasized many times (see in particular . But simultaneously, with respect to functional continuity, from the very beginning, the infant's behavior can be described from the observer's point of view as intentional and as exhibiting invariants or practical object permanence. What strikes me most about Piaget's position is the following: The emergence of conscious meanings, of mental structures producing relations of implication, does not depend on any type of representation. Nevertheless, he spoke about cousciousness as producing an internal translation (Hauert, 1980 (Hauert, , 1990 .
However, Piaget's main contribution is to have conceded a major role to these conscious phenomena and to the implicative relations as opposed to the organization of causal relations related to action. A partially comparable opposition has been reintroduced by Marcel (1983) between conscious and unconscious perception (see also Marcel & Bisiach, 1988).
My Own Position
My own attempt to reconcile continuous and discontinuous aspects of the cognitive and motor development is based on the concept of representation as an internal organization of contents .
The exceptional abilities of humans to modify behavioral determinants during development could be explained by the emergence at various periods and in particular at birth of new coding capacities. These new capacities would force the organism to retranslate, redefine, reinterpret, and rethematize some of the information accessed, that is to say to construct new representations, new frames of reference, new categories. The construction of these representations would be made through a relatively slow and complex process requiring a few years. I have described several times and again recently this construction process, so I do not present it here (see ; see also ). This process goes along with grasps of consciousness which consist of implicative or inferential links or meaning relations as defined by Piaget. However, these phenomena would be transitional and these representations could be qualified as declarative. One particularity of the model is its recursive character. Consequently no stage, including birth, begins with the absence of representations.
In this perspective, the newborn's exceptional competencies are explained by preformed representations qualified as sensorial or sensorimotor. These representations would be above all procedural in nature (an article written by Bresson, 1987 , has encouraged me to introduce the opposition between procedural and declarative representations). They account for the intersensorimotor coordinations that characterize the newborn's behavior. During their first weeks, infants behave in certain situations as if the surrounding world were intelligible: Numerous stimuli constitute for them organized patterns of information in response to which they produce organized action patterns (e.g., early prehension, imitation). This initial organization (which depends on phylogenesis and embryogenesis) ensures an initial perceptive and behavioral unity that need not be explained at the level of ontogenesis or, at least, its explanation should be facilitated. But more or less simultaneously, infants behave as if the situations they confront constitute "polymorphous sets" or a "confusing and ambiguous universe" without precise functional meaning, as, for example, in their awkward attempts to reach for an object between the 2nd and 5th months (from approximately the 6th to the 20th week) or in their unskillful attempts to retrieve a hidden object (the Anon-B error) between the 8th and 10th months. Thus, infants need several months to be able to recategorize situations and reorganize or replan their actions. It is not before 6 months that they become able to grasp in a partly adapted manner a visually perceived object, not before 1 year that they succeed in regulating or in accurately planning in advance the orientation and the shaping of the hand as a function of the size and orientation of the object, not before the age of 16 to 18 months for their grasp to be regulated as a function of the object weight inferred from its size and/or texture, and not before 20 to 24 months for their prehension to adjust to reciprocal orientation between two objects (cf. in particular Hofsten, 1989; Lockman, 1990; Another way of expressing the same story would be to say that infants, in the course of their development, construct knowledge (or concepts) which must lead them to construct new know-how. Development would therefore be a matter of shifting not only from practical (biological) know-how to conceptual or mental (psychic) knowledge (as argued by Piaget), but also, and in an equally large extent, from conceptual knowledge to new, unconscious know-how. It is in this way that new know-how, new skills are learned and automatized (prehension, walking, imitation, localization, etc).
As it is at birth, every time that we are dealing with constituted know-how, we are dealing with adapted behaviors which manifest a satisfying integration in relation with one or several econiche(s). These behaviors do not necessarily demand reflexive consciouness, intentionality, or subject-object differentiation. These behaviors can be qualified as "direct" or "immediate"-which does not mean for me that the behavior is defined by the structure of information, but much rather that there is an optimal adequacy between the organization or the structure of stimulations accessed and the organization of the action procedures (or procedural representations) of the subject. As I have stated elsewhere 
